Santa Clara Law

Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
Litigation

Research Projects and Empirical Data

3-7-2011

Virginia v. Sebelius - Constitutional Accountability
Center Amicus Brief
Constitutional Accountability Center

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/aca
Part of the Health Law Commons
Automated Citation
Constitutional Accountability Center, "Virginia v. Sebelius - Constitutional Accountability Center Amicus Brief " (2011). Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act Litigation. Paper 15.
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/aca/15

This Amicus Brief is brought to you for free and open access by the Research Projects and Empirical Data at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Litigation by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

Case: 11-1057

Document: 47-1

Date Filed: 03/07/2011

Page: 1

Nos. 11-057 & 11-1058
IN THE

United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, EX REL. KENNETH T. CUCCINELLI, II,
in his official capacity as Attorney General of Virginia,
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
v.
KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, Secretary of the Department of Health &
Human Services, in her official capacity,
Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER
IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT AND REVERSAL
Elizabeth B. Wydra
Douglas T. Kendall
CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER
1200 18th Street, N.W., Suite 1002
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 296-6889
Counsel for Amicus Curiae

Case: 11-1057

Document: 47-1

Date Filed: 03/07/2011

Page: 2

STATEMENT REGARDING CONSENT TO FILE
Both parties have consented to the filing of Constitutional Accountability Center’s brief amicus curiae.
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INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE
The Constitutional Accountability Center (CAC) is a think tank,
public interest law firm, and action center dedicated to fulfilling the
progressive promise of our Constitution’s text and history. CAC works
in our courts, through our government, and with legal scholars and the
public to improve understanding of the Constitution and to preserve the
rights, freedoms, and structural safeguards that our charter guarantees.
Constitutional Accountability Center has written extensively on
the constitutional basis for the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act 1 and has submitted testimony to the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee regarding the constitutionality of the Act under Congress’s Com-

See, e.g., Elizabeth B. Wydra, The States, Health Care Reform and the
Constitution,
available
at
http://www.theusconstitution.org/
upoad/fck/file/File_storage/The%20States,%20Health%20Care%20Refor
m,%20and%20the%20Constitution%281%29.pdf?phpMyAdmin=TzXZ9I
zqiNgbGqj5tqLH06F5Bxe; Elizabeth B. Wydra, Strange Brew: The Tea
Party’s Errant Constitutional Attacks on Health Care Reform, available
at http://theusconstitution.org/blog.history/?p=1829; Iowa Sen. Jack
Hatch & Elizabeth B. Wydra, Dismiss the Florida Lawsuit: Health Care
Reform Law Preserves Constitutional Federalism, available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/elizabeth-b-wydra/dismiss-the-floridalawsu_b_614846.html.
1
1
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merce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause powers. 2

CAC also

represents a bipartisan group of state legislators from across the country in Florida, et al. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, et al. 3
This brief draws heavily on the University of Virginia’s landmark
project, The Papers of George Washington. The researchers involved in
this massive project in historical scholarship have worked for decades to
produce the largest available collection of correspondence to and from
George Washington and to make digitized copies of these documents
available to the public, greatly improving our understanding of the
views of Washington and other important Founders on critical topics
such as the constitutional powers of the federal government.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The lower court’s vision of a federal government without the power to address a national problem such as the health care crisis has no
basis whatsoever in the Constitution’s text and history. The Father of
our Nation, George Washington, and the other delegates to the Constihttp://theusconstitution.org/blog.history/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/
Testimony-for-SJC-Hearing-on-ACA.pdf.
3 The brief CAC filed on behalf of this group of legislators is available at
http://www.theusconstitution.org/blog.history/wpcontent/uploads/
2010/11/State-Legislators-Amicus-Brief.pdf.
2
2
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tutional Convention shared a conviction that the Constitution must establish a national government of substantial power. In considering how
to grant such power to the national government, the delegates adopted
Resolution VI, which declared that Congress should have authority “to
legislate in all Cases for the general Interests of the Union, and also in
those to which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the
Harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the Exercise of individual legislation.” 2 THE RECORDS

OF THE

FEDERAL CONVENTION

OF

1787 at 131-32 (Max Farrand, ed., rev. ed. 1966).
Tasked with translating the principle of Resolution VI into specific
provisions, the Committee of Detail drafted Article I to grant Congress
the broad power to, among other things, “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. While the concept of “commerce” in
this Clause has always referred to economic activity or trade, the original meaning of “commerce” in the Constitution carried “a broader meaning referring to all forms of intercourse in the affairs of life, whether or
not narrowly economic or mediated by explicit markets.” AKHIL REED
AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 107 (2005).
3

As Chief
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Justice John Marshall explained, “Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic,
but it is something more: it is intercourse.” Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 1, 189 (1824). Thus, the lower court’s vision of a Commerce
Clause power strictly curtailed by tests of self-initiated activity and
economic subject matter cannot be squared with the Clause’s original
meaning. Congress’s regulation of the decision not to buy health insurance under the Commerce Clause is plainly constitutional.
The lower court’s interpretation of the Necessary and Proper
Clause is similarly unsupported by constitutional text and history. Far
from the cramped vision of the Clause used by the court below, which
would permit Congress to regulate only by using means that are themselves covered by the Commerce Clause (effectively rendering the Necessary and Proper Clause a nullity), the grant of power to “make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution”
constitutionally granted powers was intended to be sweeping.

U.S.

CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 18. As Alexander Hamilton explained to President
Washington, “[t]he means by which national exigencies are to be provided for, national inconveniences obviated, national prosperity promoted, are of such infinite variety, extent and complexity, that there
4
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must of necessity be great latitude of discretion in the selection and application of those means.” THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON DIGITAL
EDITION (Theodore J. Crackel, ed. 2008) (Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to
Establish a Bank, 1791). As recognized by our first President, the rest
of the Framers, and the Supreme Court from the Founding to the
present, the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the power to
use means outside the enumerated list of Article I powers to achieve the
ends contemplated in the Constitution.
Under a faithful reading of the Constitution, the minimum coverage provision of the Affordable Care Act is a valid exercise of Congress’s
Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause powers.

If the

Court finds that the Commonwealth has standing to challenge the minimum coverage provision, the ruling below should be reversed on the
merits.

5
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ARGUMENT
I.

The Framers Wrote The Constitution To Give The
Federal Government Broad Legislative Power To
Address National Concerns.

Our Constitution was drafted in 1787 “in Order to form a more
perfect Union”—both more perfect than the British tyranny against
which the founding generation had revolted and more perfect than the
flawed Articles of Confederation under which Americans had lived for a
decade since declaring independence. The result was a vibrant system
of federalism that gives broad power to the federal government to act in
circumstances in which a national approach is necessary or preferable,
while reserving a significant role for the States to craft innovative policy solutions reflecting the diversity of America’s people, places, and
ideas.
While some have portrayed the Constitution as a document that is
all about limiting government, particularly during the legal and political debate over the constitutionality of health care reform, the historical
context shows that the Founders were just as, if not more, concerned
with creating an empowered, effective national government than with
setting stark limits on federal power.
6
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By the time our Founders took up the task of drafting the Constitution in 1787, they had lived for nearly a decade under the dysfunctional Articles of Confederation. The Articles of Confederation, adopted
by the Second Continental Congress in 1777 and ratified in 1781, established a confederacy built merely on a “firm league of friendship” between thirteen independent states.

ARTICLES

OF

CONFEDERATION

(1781), art. III. There was only a single branch of national government,
the Congress, which was made up of state delegations. ARTICLES

OF

CONFEDERATION, art. V. Congress under the Articles of Confederation
had some powers, but was given no means to execute those powers.
Congress could not directly tax individuals or legislate upon them; it
had no express power to make laws that would be binding in the states’
courts and no general power to establish national courts, and it could
raise money only by making requests to the states.
This created such an ineffectual central government that, according to George Washington, it nearly cost Americans victory in the Revolutionary War. In the midst of several American setbacks during the
war, Washington lamented that, “unless Congress speaks with a more
decisive tone; unless they are vested with powers by the several States
7
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competent to the great purposes of War . . . our Cause is lost.” 18 THE
WRITINGS

OF

GEORGE WASHINGTON 453 (John C. Fitzpatrick, ed. 1931)

(Letter to Joseph Jones, May 31, 1780). See also WASHINGTON: WRITINGS

393 (John Rhodehamel, ed. 1997) (Circular to State Governments,

Oct. 18, 1780). Washington believed that the inability of the central
government to address common concerns such as the maintenance of an
army could bring disaster: “The sufferings of a complaining army, on
the one hand, and the inability of Congress and tardiness of the States
on the other, are the forebodings of evil.” Id. at 488 (Letter to Alexander Hamilton, March 4, 1783).
Washington favored strong federal power not just for military
matters, but also in other general issues of national concern. Shortly
after the Revolutionary War was won, Washington wrote to Alexander
Hamilton stating plainly that “[n]o man in the United States is, or can
be more deeply impressed with the necessity of a reform in our present
Confederation than myself.” Id. at 505 (Letter to Alexander Hamilton,
March 31, 1783). Washington explained that, “unless Congress have
powers competent to all general purposes, that the distresses we have
encountered, the expences we have incurred, and the blood we have
8
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spilt in the course of an Eight years war, will avail us nothing.” Id. at
490 (Letter to Alexander Hamilton, March 4, 1783) (emphasis in original). 4 See also id. at 519 (Circular to State Governments, June 8, 1783)
(“[I]t is indispensible to the happiness of the individual States, that
there should be lodged somewhere, a Supreme Power to regulate and
govern the general concerns of the Confederated Republic, without
which the Union cannot be of long duration.”).
The difficulty Massachusetts had in quelling Shay’s Rebellion in
1786 further convinced Washington of the great need for improving
upon the Articles of Confederation: “What stronger evidence can be given of the want of energy in our governments than these disorders? If
there exists not a power to check them, what security has a man of life,
Indeed, it is indicative of the shift from revolution to statecraft that
the Constitution’s first Article gives Congress the power to impose a
broad range of “Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.” U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 1. “Thus, only a decade after they revolted against imperial taxes, Americans were being asked to authorize a sweeping regime of continental taxes, with the decisive difference that these new taxes would
be decided on by public servants chosen by the American people themselves—taxation with representation.” AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 107 (2005). Suggestions that the legitimate complaints of the “Boston Tea Party” in 1775 animated the
Founders during the Constitutional Convention in 1787 are thus deeply
flawed. E.g., Florida et al. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., et
al., No. 3:10-cv-00091-RV, Order Granting Summary Judgment, Jan.
31, 2011.
9
4
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liberty, or property?” 4 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: CONFEDERATION

SERIES 332 (W.W. Abbot et al., eds. 1992) (Letter to James Mad-

ison, Nov. 5, 1786).
After the Revolutionary War was won, the Founders turned their
focus on creating a new, better form of government with a sufficiently
strong federal power. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention
shared Washington’s conviction that the Constitution must establish a
government of sufficient power. In considering how to grant such power
to the national government, the delegates adopted Resolution VI, which
declared that Congress should have authority “to legislate in all Cases
for the general Interests of the Union, and also in those Cases to which
the States are separately incompetent, or in which the Harmony of the
United States may be interrupted by the Exercise of individual legislation.” 2 THE RECORDS

OF THE

FEDERAL CONVENTION

OF

1787 at 131-32

(Max Farrand, ed., rev. ed. 1966). See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 108 (2005); Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109
MICH. L. REV. 1, 8-12 (2010). The delegates then passed Resolution VI
on to the Committee of Detail, which was responsible for drafting the
enumerated powers of Congress in Article I, to transform this general
10
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principle into an enumerated list of powers in the Constitution. Id. at
10.
As constitutional scholar Jack Balkin explains, Resolution VI established a structural constitutional principle with “its focus on state
competencies and the general interests of the Union.” Id. Translating
this principle into specific provisions, the Committee of Detail drafted
Article I to grant Congress the broad power to, among other things, regulate interstate commerce and tax and spend to “provide for the . . .
general Welfare of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1.
These enumerated powers were intended to capture the idea that
“whatever object of government extends, in its operation or effects,
beyond the bounds of a particular state, should be considered as belonging to the government of the United States.” 2 THE DEBATES
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS
STITUTION AS
PHIA

ON THE

ADOPTION

OF THE

IN THE

FEDERAL CON-

RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADEL-

424 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) (hereinafter ELLIOT’S DE-

BATES)

(Statement of James Wilson).

The enumeration of powers was not intended to displace the general principle of Resolution VI that Congress should have the general
11
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ability to legislate in matters of national concern. As James Wilson, a
member of the Committee of Detail who was also “America’s leading
lawyer and one of only six men to have signed both the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution,”5 explained:
[T]hough this principle be sound and satisfactory, its application to particular cases would be accompanied with much
difficulty, because, in its application, room must be allowed
for great discretionary latitude of construction of the principle. In order to lessen or remove the difficulty arising from
discretionary construction on this subject, an enumeration of
particular instances, in which the application of the principle
ought to take place, has been attempted with much industry
and care.
2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 424-25 (emphasis added). The drafters of the Constitution thus made clear that in each enumerated instance in Article
I—whether regulating “commerce” or levying taxes—the understanding
was that Congress would exercise the enumerated power while applying
the general principle that Congress has power to regulate in cases of
national concern. 6 This list of enumerated powers was not an attempt

AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, at 7.
Some scholars have suggested that the Committee of Detail rejected
Resolution VI or that the Convention repudiated it because the precise
language of the Resolution was not written into the Constitution. E.g.,
RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004). But after the delegates passed Resolution VI,
12
5
6
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to limit the federal government for its own sake, but rather “[t]he list of
enumerated powers was designed so that the new federal government
would have power to pass laws on subjects and concerning problems
that are federal by nature.” Balkin, Commerce, at 12.
II.

Focused On More Than Just Trade or Economic
Transactions, The Framers Included The Commerce
Clause In The Constitution To Allow The Federal
Government To Legislate Affairs Among The Several
States That Require A Federal Response.

The Commerce Clause provides that “Congress shall have Power
. . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Given
that the Committee of Detail drafted the Commerce Clause to manifest
the principle of Resolution VI that Congress should have power to reguthe Committee of Detail had no power to reject it, and, as Wilson’s
comments make clear, the Committee embraced the Resolution’s principle and attempted to implement it in Article I. See Balkin, Commerce,
at 10-11. While some today may prefer not to have a government of
such broad power, a faithful reading of the Constitution’s text and history, as even conservative scholars have acknowledged, leads to the
conclusion “that the powers conferred on the national government are
huge, sweeping, overlapping, and, when taken together, very nearly
comprehensive.” Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Government of Adequate
Powers, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 991, 991-92 (2008). See also id. at
992 (noting that even if one believes that, “politically, the full exercise of
such powers might be unpopular or constitute bad public policy does not
mean that the Constitution did not, in fact, confer such broad powers”).
13
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late matters of national concern, the Commerce Clause’s “text looks the
way it does because a basic structural principle underlies the text, and
in fact, the text was written precisely to articulate that general principle.” Balkin, Commerce, at 7. In other words, “Congress’s power to
regulate commerce ‘among the several states’ is closely linked to the
general structural purpose of Congress’s enumerated powers as articulated by the Framers: to give Congress power to legislate in all cases
where states are separately incompetent or where the interest of the
nation might be undermined by unilateral or conflicting state action.”
Id. at 6.
While commerce has always referred to economic activity or trade,
the original meaning of “commerce” in the Constitution carried “a
broader meaning referring to all forms of intercourse in the affairs of
life, whether or not narrowly economic or mediated by explicit markets.”
AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, at 107. See also Balkin, Commerce, at
15-17. “The concept of ‘commerce’ in the eighteenth century had strong
social connotations which are almost the opposite of our modern focus
on commodities.” Id. at 16. To demonstrate, constitutional scholar Akhil Amar cites Bolingbroke’s famous mid-eighteenth-century tract, The
14
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Idea of a Patriot King, which spoke of the “free and easy commerce of
social life,” and the Oxford English Dictionary, which referred to “our
Lord’s commerce with his disciples.” AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION,
at 107.
Only if “commerce” is read in light of this broader dictionary definition and usage does the Commerce Clause effectuate the Framers’ direction that Congress should have authority to “legislate in all Cases for
the general Interests of the Union, and also in those Cases to which the
States are separately incompetent, or in which the harmony of the
United States may be interrupted by the Exercise of individual Legislation.” 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 131-32;
see supra Section I. Particularly as related to the Commerce Clause,
federal issues may generally be described as problems that single states
cannot solve on their own, either because a matter has spillover effects
in other states or because there is a collective action problem in which
states are unwilling or unable to act effectively. Cf. AMAR, AMERICA’S
CONSTITUTION, at 107 (noting that reading interstate and international
“commerce” broadly in the Commerce Clause fits with “the framers’
general goals by enabling Congress to regulate . . . interactions that, if
15
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improperly handled by a single state acting on its own, might lead to
needless wars or otherwise compromise the interests of sister states”).
Indeed, before the Constitutional Convention, George Washington noted
the dangers of a lack of federal power to act uniformly in areas of commerce, predicting that if states tried to regulate trade, “a many-headed
monster would be the issue.” 3 THE PAPERS

OF

GEORGE WASHINGTON:

CONFEDERATION SERIES 423 (Letter to David Stuart, Nov. 30, 1785).
As Chief Justice John Marshall observed in Gibbons v. Ogden, if
commerce were limited merely to active trade of goods, Congress would
not be able to regulate in areas of keen federal interest, such as navigation to and from foreign nations. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824). In
Gibbons, Marshall explained that “[c]ommerce, undoubtedly, is traffic,
but it is something more: it is intercourse.” Id. See generally Balkin,
Commerce, at 21 (“When people like George Washington, John Marshall, and Joseph Story use the words ‘commerce’ and ‘intercourse’ interchangeably, perhaps we should listen to them.”).
National power to regulate commerce, broadly defined, was so
high on the Founders’ agenda that George Washington, on his way to
his first inauguration as President, stopped to declare to a Delaware
16
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crowd that, “The promotion of domestic manufactures will, in my conception, be among the first consequences which may naturally be expected to flow from an energetic government.” 2 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 78 (W.W. Abbot et al., eds. 1987).
(“To the Delaware Soc’y for Promoting Domestic Manufacturers,” April
19-20, 1789). Washington believed in “a liberal construction of the national powers,” 7 THE PAPERS

OF

GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL

SERIES 396, and his Delaware speech indicates that he considered the
promotion of commerce as an appropriate function of “an energetic government,” 2 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES
78.
While the meaning of commerce in the Constitution was certainly
intended to be broad, the text of the Commerce Clause places significant
limits on federal regulation: Congress can only act if a given problem
genuinely spills across state or national lines. As Chief Justice Marshall explained in Gibbons, the Commerce Clause uses the word
“among” to mean “intermingled with” and that “commerce among the
States” means “commerce which concerns more States than one.” 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194. If commerce within a single state has external
17
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effects on other states or on the Nation as a whole then it falls under
Congress’s constitutional regulatory authority; if commerce is “completely internal” to a state, then Congress has no power to regulate. Id.
at 194. The “among” requirement of the Commerce Clause thus allows
Congress to regulate interactions or affairs among the several states,
including matters “that are mingled among the states or affect more
than one state, because they cross state borders, because they produce
collective action problems among the states, or because they involve activity in one state that has spillover effects in other states.” Balkin,
Commerce, at 23. See also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
In other words, the Commerce Clause contains an important limiting
principle—but it is derived more from the word “among” than from an
improperly narrow reading of “commerce.”
Reading the Commerce Clause with the broad understanding of
“commerce” as “intercourse,” and the limitation that such “intercourse”
must be truly federal in nature in that it affects national interests or
involves a matter that states cannot effectively address on their own,
connects the text of the Clause to the principle in Resolution VI that

18
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animated the drafting of Congress’s enumerated powers in Article I. As
Chief Justice Marshall explained in interpreting the Commerce Clause:
The genius and character of the whole government seem
to be, that its action is to be applied to all the external
concerns of the nation, and to those internal concerns
which affect the States generally; but not to those which
are completely within a particular State, which do not affect other States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general
powers of the government.
Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195.
III. Under The Text And Original Meaning Of The Necessary And Proper Clause, Congress Has Broad Latitude
To Employ Legislative Means Naturally Related To
The Lawful Objects Or Ends Of The Federal Government.
As discussed above in Sections I and II, the drafters of the Constitution were mindful of Resolution VI’s general principle—that Congress
should have the ability to respond to matters of national concern—in
wording the enumerated powers broadly. In the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton exhorted the nation that
we must bear in mind that we are not to confine our view
to the present period, but to look forward to remote futurity. . . . Nothing, therefore, can be more fallacious than to
infer the extent of any power, proper to be lodged in the
national government from an estimate of its immediate
necessities. There ought to be a capacity to provide for
19
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future exigencies as they may happen; and as these are
illimitable in their nature, so it is impossible safely to
limit that capacity.
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 34, at 203 (emphasis in original).
Perhaps nowhere in the Constitution is the goal to provide Congress with discretion to address matters both now and in the future
more manifest than in the Necessary and Proper Clause. The Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the power “[t]o make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in
the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. As Hamilton explained to President Washington, “[t]he means by which national exigencies are to be
provided for, national inconveniences obviated, national prosperity
promoted, are of such infinite variety, extent and complexity, that there
must of necessity be great latitude of discretion in the selection and application of those means.” THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON DIGITAL
EDITION (Theodore J. Crackel, ed. 2008) (Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to
Establish a Bank, 1791).
20
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The congressional powers written into the Constitution by the
Founders are even stronger when coupled with Article I, section 8’s
sweeping grant of authority to Congress to make laws that are “necessary and proper” for carrying out the other federal powers granted by
the Constitution.

As Hamilton explained to President Washington,

“[t]he whole turn of the [Necessary and Proper Clause] indicates that it
was the intent of the Convention, by that clause, to give a liberal latitude to the exercise of the specified powers.” Letter from Hamilton to
Washington, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a
Bank, 1791. While the government obviously has no right “to do merely what it pleases,” Hamilton explained the broad discretion given to
Congress under the Necessary and Proper Clause as follows: “If the end
be clearly comprehended within any of the specified powers, and if the
measure have an obvious relation to that end, and is not forbidden by
any particular provision of the constitution; it may safely be deemed to
come within the compass of the national authority.” Id.
President Washington agreed with Hamilton’s exegesis of the constitutional powers of the federal government, approving the bill to establish a national bank over the objections of other members of his cab21
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inet, including Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, and hailing Hamilton’s vision of federal power. 8 THE PAPERS

OF

GEORGE WASHINGTON:

PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 359 (Letter to David Humphreys, July 20, 1791).
The Supreme Court, from the Founding-era to the present, has also agreed with Hamilton’s view of federal power under the Necessary
and Proper Clause. Chief Justice John Marshall explained in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), that Congress should
be shown significant deference regarding what laws it considers to be
appropriate in carrying out its constitutional duties. In language very
similar to Hamilton’s, the Court in McCulloch explained, “[l]et the end
be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional.” 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421. Just last
Term, the Supreme Court affirmed that so long as Congress does not
run afoul of any other constitutional provision, the Necessary and Proper Clause affords Congress the power to use any “means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated
power.” United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010). As the
22
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Supreme Court has long held, “the Necessary and Proper Clause makes
clear that the Constitution’s grants of specific federal legislative authority are accompanied by broad power to enact laws that are ‘convenient,
or useful’ or ‘conducive’ to the authority’s ‘beneficial exercise.’” Id. at
1956 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 413, 418,
421).
To be sure, the powers of the federal government under our Constitution are not unlimited. As the Tenth Amendment affirms, U.S.
CONST. amend. X, the Constitution establishes a central government of
enumerated powers, and the States play a vital role in our federalist
system. But the powers our charter does grant to the federal government are broad and substantial.7 And, since the Founding, the American people have amended the Constitution to ensure that Congress has
all the tools it needs to address national problems and protect the constitutional rights of all Americans.

E.g., U.S. CONST. amends. XIII,

XIV, XV, XVI, XIX. Through particular enumerated powers, as well as
See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, Opinion
on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank, 1791 (discussing
“the variety and extent of public exigencies, a far greater proportion of
which, and of a far more critical kind, are objects of National than of
State—administration”).
23
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through sweeping enforcement clauses such as Article I’s Necessary and
Proper Clause, the Constitution realizes the Framers’ design for a federal government able “to legislate in all Cases for the general interests
of the Union, and also in those to which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the Harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the Exercise of individual legislation.” 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 131-32.
IV.

The Constitution’s Text And History Support The
Constitutionality Of The Affordable Care Act’s Minimum Coverage Provision.

Congress’s authority to pass legislation to fix problems in the
health care industry is firmly rooted in Congress’s constitutional power
to regulate interstate commerce and to enact laws that are necessary
and proper to exercise that power.8 Since the health care industry comprises nearly 20 percent of the U.S. economy, no one can seriously dispute that Congress has the authority to regulate health care and the
health insurance industries under its Commerce Clause power. The
Commonwealth thus aims more narrowly at whether Congress has the
This brief focuses on the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and
Proper Clause; it does not address other potential sources of constitutional power to enact the Affordable Care Act.
24
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power to enact the minimum coverage provision, which generally requires individuals who can afford it to purchase health insurance or pay
a tax penalty if they refuse to do so. Through a fundamentally flawed
reading of the Constitution, the court below held that Congress did not
have the power to enact the minimum coverage provision.
A. Commerce Clause
The Supreme Court has held that Congress has the authority to
regulate the channels of interstate commerce, the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce and persons or things in interstate commerce, and
matters that substantially affect interstate commerce. E.g., Perez v.
United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545
U.S. 1, 16-17 (2005). Under Supreme Court precedent and the Constitution’s text and history, the minimum coverage provision is a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.
According to an extensive record of data compiled by Congress, the
decision not to buy health insurance substantially affects interstate
commerce. See, e.g., Br. of U.S. at 10-11; 31-34. This is true even under
a narrow, economics-based understanding of “commerce.” For example,
in Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress, as part of
25
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its regulation of interstate commerce in illegal drugs, could prohibit a
person from growing marijuana in her own backyard for personal, medicinal use (in a State where doing so was legal under local law). Certainly if backyard, medicinal marijuana cultivation for personal use
falls under Congress’s Commerce Clause power, Congress can regulate
the decision to be uninsured when it comes to health care.
Looking at Congress’s Commerce Clause power based on the text
and history of the Constitution, Congress’s power to enact the minimum
coverage provision is even clearer. Under Resolution VI, the principle
behind enumerated powers such as the Commerce Clause is to give
Congress the ability “to legislate in all Cases for the general interests of
the Union, and also in those to which the States are separately incompetent.” 2 THE RECORDS

OF THE

FEDERAL CONVENTION

OF

1787 at 131-

32. Here, the spillover effects caused by individuals’ decisions to remain uninsured affect the nation as a whole. See, e.g., Br. of U.S. at 1011; 31-39; 44-48. Even if, like the lower court, this Court conceived of
the decision to remain uninsured as a non-economic matter, this would
be irrelevant: under the original meaning of the Commerce Clause, the
real question is whether such a decision causes spillover effects, which
26
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may themselves be economic in nature, creating a problem for more
than a single state. See Balkin, Commerce, at 44. In addition, the minimum coverage provision addresses collective action problems in the
States: there is the distinct possibility that “[p]eople with health problems will have incentives to move to a state where they cannot be
turned down, raising health care costs for everyone, while insurers will
prefer to do business in states where they can avoid more expensive patients with pre-existing conditions, and younger and healthier people
may leave for jurisdictions where they can avoid paying for health insurance.” Id. at 46. The minimum coverage provision falls squarely
within Congress’s ability to regulate “commerce” “for the general interests of the Union,” and also in those instances in “which the States are
separately incompetent.” 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF

1787 at 131-32.
B. Necessary & Proper Clause
For the reasons discussed above, this Court can and should uphold

the minimum coverage provision as a constitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.

However, the Court could also

uphold the provision as a law that is “necessary and proper for carrying
27
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into execution” 9 Congress’s power to regulate commerce among the several States. The Affordable Care Act is designed to make health care
coverage affordable to all Americans and to prohibit certain insurance
practices, such as the denial of coverage to individuals with pre-existing
conditions. See, e.g., Br. of U.S. at 13-15. Among many other reasons, if
Americans can go uninsured until they get sick and then impose these
costs on those who already have health insurance policies, the ban on
pre-existing conditions will be prohibitively expensive and the cost of
insurance will increase across the board. Id. at 41-48. Congress determined that the minimum coverage provision was the appropriate means
of regulating the health care and insurance markets. Since the Act does
not run afoul of any other constitutional provision—there is no constitutional right to inflict uninsured health care costs on the American taxpayers—health care reform falls squarely within Congress’s power to
regulate commerce and enact necessary and proper legislation to carry
out this power.
The lower court rejected the Secretary’s necessary and proper argument based on a blatant misreading of the Necessary and Proper

9

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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Clause. The court stated that “[i]f a person’s decision not to purchase
health insurance at a particular point in time does not constitute the
type of economic activity subject to regulation under the Commerce
Clause, then logically an attempt to enforce such provision under the
Necessary and Proper Clause is equally offensive to the Constitution.”
Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 779 (E.D. Va.
2010). This is neither logical nor correct.
The court below appears to have read the Necessary and Proper
Clause to allow only those means of execution that are absolutely indispensable to the power being executed. But this interpretation of the
Clause was soundly rejected more than two hundred years ago. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 413 (rejecting the argument
that the Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to pass only
those laws “such as are indispensable, and without which the power
would be nugatory”). See also id. at 406, 408 (explaining that the framers of the Constitution did not intend to impede the exercise of enumerated powers “by withholding a choice of means,” noting that, unlike
the Articles of Confederation, the Constitution does not “require[] that
everything granted shall be expressly and minutely described”). As Al29
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exander Hamilton wrote to President Washington, the idea that the
Clause allows only means of execution that are so necessary that without them “the grant of the power would be nugatory,” is so potentially
detrimental to constitutional government that “[i]t is essential to the being of the National Government that so erroneous a conception of the
word necessary, shou’d be exploded.” Letter from Alexander Hamilton
to George Washington, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank, 1791 (emphasis in original). “Necessary” in the Clause
“means no more than needful, requisite, incidental, useful, or conducive
to” the enumerated grant of power. Id. (emphasis in original). See also
United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010) (holding that
the Necessary and Proper Clause affords Congress the power to use any
“means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power”).
Moreover, requiring individuals to obtain or purchase particular
items is not as unprecedented as some critics claim. As Professor Adam
Winkler has explained,10 just five years after the Constitution was

Adam Winkler, The Founders’ ‘Individual Mandate,’ available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-winkler/the-founding-fathersindi_b_523001.html.
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drafted, in the second 1792 Militia Act,11 Congress required male citizens to obtain certain weapons and other items, such as a “knapsack,”
ammunition, and, in some cases, “a serviceable horse.” This was a necessary and proper regulation to effectuate Congress’s power to raise
armies. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (granting Congress power to “raise
and support Armies”). In the modern day case of health care, the individual responsibility provision’s requirement to obtain health insurance
if one can afford it is a necessary and proper regulation effectuating
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.
C. Principles of Federalism
Given the lower court’s suggestion that this case in some way “implicat[es] the Tenth Amendment,” 728 F. Supp. 2d at 771, it bears noting that neither the Affordable Care Act generally, nor the minimum
coverage provision specifically, infringes upon the reserved sovereignty
of the States or principles of federalism. States historically have been
leaders in policy innovations that better protect their citizens, resources, and environment. See Exec. Order on Federalism No. 13132,
64 Fed. Reg. 43255, § 2(e) (Aug. 4, 1999) (“States possess unique author11

Text available at http://www.constitution.org/mil/mil_act_1792.htm.
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ities, qualities, and abilities to meet the needs of the people and should
function as laboratories of democracy.”). The States have a long history
of leadership on health care reform—indeed, the Affordable Care Act
incorporated the valuable lessons learned from the experience of health
care reform practices by state and local governments, and preserves the
role of the States as laboratories of democracy by giving States considerable policy flexibility. The Affordable Care Act is appropriately respectful of constitutional principles of vibrant federalism.
For example, States have the discretion to form their own insurance exchange or join with other States to form a regional exchange.
See ACA § 1321, 42 U.S.C. 18041. A State may also choose not to operate an exchange at all, in which case the federal government will administer a statewide insurance exchange for the benefit of the State’s citizens. Id. at § 1321(c). While States must provide the opportunity to
buy four levels of health care plans on the exchange—platinum, gold,
silver, and bronze plans, at declining expense—they have significant
discretion with respect to other aspects of the plans. See ACA § 1331,
42 U.S.C. 18051. States can also set up their own programs—with or
without an individual responsibility provision, or with a public option—
32
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under what has been called the Empowering States to Be Innovative
provision. ACA § 1332, 42 U.S.C. 18052. States can obtain a waiver
from the federal government if they set up a system that meets the coverage and cost containment requirements in the Act. Id. The Affordable Care Act thus regulates health care to the extent necessary to solve
the national problem, while allowing for the diversity and innovation
that is the hallmark of the States. See generally New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (observing that, under our federalism, “a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country”).
***
From the broad and substantial powers granted to Congress in the
1787 Constitution, to the sweeping enforcement powers added to the
Constitution through the amendment process in the last two centuries,
our Constitution establishes a federal government that is strong enough
to act when the national interest requires a national solution.
Congress has the power to regulate the nearly 20 percent of the
U.S. economy that is the health care industry, and, when faced with a
33
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national health care crisis where millions are uninsured and cannot afford decent health care, is empowered to act to reform the health care
industry. The Affordable Care Act’s minimum coverage provision fits
within Congress’s Commerce Clause power and is also a necessary and
proper means of effectuating Congress’s regulation of the health care
industry. Far from offending constitutional principles of federalism, the
Act reflects how the federal and state governments can work together to
protect their citizens and resources.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, amicus respectfully requests that, if the
Court finds that the Commonwealth has standing, the Court reverse
the ruling of the district court on the merits.
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